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American law had to be based on English law-in some sense and to
some degree. The questions that had to be initially decided were; In what
sense? and To what degree? Was the common law to be taken over lock,
stock and barrel, subject to subsequent change at the hands of American
courts? Or was the common law, along with a few statutes, to be
imported selectively-with the English rules entitled to receive
recognition as American rules only when adopted in American cases by
American courts?
Grant Gilmore'
I. A CONUNDRUM
Michigan's 1850 Constitution provided that "the common law, and
the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall
remain in force until they expire by their own limitations or are altered or
repealed by the legislature." 2 This provision of the Constitution played
the role that was, in many states, played by a statute: in the usual
parlance, Michigan had thus "received" the common law, and this

t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. This essay stems from a
request by the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society to produce a discussion of the
reception of the common law in Michigan. I thank Judge Avern Cohn for providing the
opportunity for, and invaluable assistance in, the research and formulation of this article.
Errors are of course my own responsibility.
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 20 (1977).

2. MICH. CONST. of 1850, sch.,

§ 1.
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provision "adopted" or "incorporated" an English body of legally
authoritative norms to serve in future judicial decisions. 3
At first glance, the idea seems straightforward. Many lawyers in the
early days of America's founding were trained in English law, of which
the common law was a dominant constituent; their legal training
therefore meant they were trained to understand, and use, the common
law.4 Moreover, while books might be expensive and scarce in the New
World, American lawyers would have comparatively ready access to
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, and thus to
Blackstone's extended discussions of such standards as assumpsit and
trespass, as those ideas had been developed and applied in English legal
decisions.' Further, behind those particular discussions stood the basic
idea that the "common" law was distinctive about English law and
governance, a special heritage that was also available to American
lawyers once they learned the common law's rules and concepts. 6 So,
authoritative texts like Michigan's Constitution, which explicitly
embraced the common law and enshrined it as part of the state's law and
tradition, could be expected to be the norm, and hardly worthy of notice.
If only. On inspection, it turns out that the matter is vastly more
complicated, and more interesting, than that.' The apparently
straightforward idea turns out to be complex, often confusing, and in
need of a more subtle understanding. In American Legal History,
Professors Hall, Wiecek and Finkelman wrote:
American lawyers today like to think that the common law was
the only body of English law that Americans drew on for their
own law, that it was adopted early in the period of English
settlement, and that its reception was both inevitable and noncontroversial. Each of these assumptions is wrong.8
This essay explores how these, and many other assumptions, are wrong
about the common law and its reception.9

3. Id.
4. See Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American

Colonies, 30 U. PA. L. REv. 553 (1882).
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., 3rd ed. 1884).
6. Id.
7. See Dale, supra note 4, at 554.
8. KERMIT HALL, WILLIAM M. WIECEK & PAUL FINKELMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2nd ed. 1996).

9. Id.

2017]

MICHIGAN'S RECEPTIONOF THE COMMON LAW

397

To focus that exploration, consider Moore v Sanborn,'0 decided by
the Michigan Supreme Court in 1853, just three years after the adoption
of the 1850 Constitution and its reception of the common law. The court
there was called on to determine the 'navigability' of the Pine River, a
tributary to the St. Claire River." Michigan's geography-bordering on
the Great Lakes and carved by a number of substantial rivers-meant
that the navigability of those waterways was an important legal issue. 12
Before Moore, the test of navigability-both in England and, it appears,
in Michigan-had generally followed a traditional standard in which a
river was classified as navigable only upon evidence of actual
commercial navigation. 13 In pursuing the question, the Moore court
observed that the Pine River was effectively divided into two parts-one
above, and one below the town of Deer Licks. 14 While the downriver
portion allowed for regular use by boats, the upriver portion was only
sometimes usable to float logs. 15 Although the upriver portion had been
used in this way for "fifteen or sixteen years" 6 , the evidence indicated
that the portion of the river in question "was only capable of being used
for floatage during periodical freshets" which would usually last for only
two to three weeks. 17 Accordingly, when the logs jammed the river and
"occasioned delay" another user of the river complained of injury.' The
other user's complaint would lie only if all the public had a right to use
the river, and that would hold only if the river was 'navigable.' 19 It was
argued in defense that the upriver part of the river was not navigable
"because it was incapable of commercial use by boat and hence not a
public highway under English common law." 20 Rejecting the rule of
English common law, the court adopted instead a "log floating" test of
navigability that had been accepted by an earlier Maine decision.21
The true test, therefore, to be applied in such cases is, whether a
stream is inherently and in its nature, capable of being used for
the purposes of commerce for the floating of vessels, boats, rafts,
10. Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519 (1853).
11. Id. at 520.
12. Id. at 520-23.
13. Id at 519.
14. Id. at 520-21.
15. Id. at 521.
16. Id. at 523.
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 180-81, 214 N.W.2d
856 (1974).
21. Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 21 (1849).
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or logs. Where a stream possesses such a character, then the
easement exists, leaving to the owners of the bed all other modes
of use, not inconsistent with it. 22
There is an obvious tension-if not outright contradiction-between
the Constitution's incorporation of the common law, on the one hand,
and the Supreme Court's roughly contemporaneous rejection, on the
other, of a well-established rule of English common law in favor of an
altogether new, and different, rule of decision. It would be troubling if
Michigan's Supreme Court simply ignored the strictures of Michigan's
Constitution, so soon after its enactment. Unless the court's decisionmaking can be seen as somehow respecting the authority of the common
law, regardless of how it appears, there would seem to be a conflict of
ideals between the English understanding of common law, on the one
hand, and the vision of common law judging, on the other, that was
embraced by Michigan's Supreme Court. The problem seems
particularly acute when we consider the timing of Moore. Not much
more than a decade later, the Michigan Supreme Court was populated by
famous names: Cooley, Campbell, Christiancy, and Graves, sometimes
subsumed under the label "the Big Four." 23 Together, those four justices
were "generally rated as one of the finest appellate courts in the
24
country-for a while perhaps 'the ablest State court that ever existed."'
Moreover, the period after 1850 was a fecund period in American
judging, characterized by Grant Gilmore as "an orgy of statute
making." 2 5 Viewed in light of what came after it, Moore would seem to
stand as a notable beginning in what would emerge as a period of judicial
activism of the first rank.
I contend that the tension is more apparent than real, and that in
Moore, the Michigan Supreme Court was faithful to its obligations under
the 1850 Constitution. Put differently, if I can free the court from the
charge that it flouted English common law, I can also free it from the
charge that it flouted the strictures of the Michigan Constitution. In so
doing, I will explore some of the subtleties in the idea of "receiving" the
common law.

22. Moore, 2 Mich. at 524-25.
23. Edward M. Wise, The Ablest State Court: The Michigan Supreme Court Before
1885, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1509 (1987) (paying special attention to footnote 2).
24. Id. (quoting Irving Browne, The Lawyer's Easy Chair, 10 GREEN BAG 495
(1894)).
25. See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 23.
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II. RECEPTION IN THE COLONIES

If we start with a simple view of legal authority, then we are led
down a particular path to a particular understanding of the common law's
reception. Once the common law is received, this view holds, it becomes
authoritative, and hence binding on future judicial decisions. It is a
complex matter to categorize the body of norms that comprises the
common law (more about this later), but however we might categorize
them, those norms become law upon their reception. Common law norms
could, of course, be displaced by later enactments, but where they are not
displaced, they should govern. Hence, common law rules, once received,
should bind Michigan courts, just as if those rules had been promulgated
by Michigan courts in the first place.
There is much to support this vision of the common law's postreception authority. Consider, for example, the wording of Virginia's
reception statute, enacted in 1776 by the General Convention of Virginia
Representatives and Delegates, and the pattern for many such statutes to
follow:
. . . that the common law of England, all statutes and acts of
Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth
year of the reign of King James the first [1607], and which are of
a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with the
several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now in force,
so far as the same may consist with several ordinances,
declarations, and resolutions of the General Convention, shall be
the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until
the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this
126
colony.
This statute puts the common law of England-at least that part of
the common law which is "of a general nature, not local" to Englandon the same footing as English statutes enacted "in aid of' that law
before the Virginia colony was settled.27 And all the English imports
were put on the same footing as Virginia's own enactments-all of them,
that is, "in full force" until displaced.28 The picture that is sometimes
drawn from this reception can be lofty. "The common law of England we
are to pay great deference to, as being a general system of improved
26. State Statutes Receiving the Common Law of England, INST. FOR U.S. LAW,

http://iuslaw.org/reception-statutes.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
27. Id.
28. See INST. FOR U.S. LAW, supra note 26.
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reason, and a source from whence our principles of jurisprudence have
been mostly drawn." 29 And:
When the American Colonies were first settled by our ancestors
it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers
of England, that they brought hither as a birthright and
inheritance so much of the common law as was applicable to
their local situation, and change of circumstances. 30
Reception of the common law was then held to imply a wholesale
incorporation of that law's rules and doctrines.
Whenever a principle of the common law has been once clearly
and unquestionably recognized and established, the courts of this
country must enforce it, until it be repealed by the legislature, as
long as there is a subject-matter for the principle to operate upon,
and although the reason in the opinion of the court which.
induced its original establishment may have ceased to exist. This
we conceive to be the established doctrine of the courts of this
country in every state where the principles of the common law
prevail.
Further investigation, however, reveals a more complex picture.
Among other things, there was hostility in the colonies toward English
law, well before the Revolution, and its status as a birthright to be
cherished was not universally accepted.32 John Winthrop of Virginia
asserted, "our allegiance binds us not the laws of England any longer
than while we live in England, for the laws of the Parliament of England
reach no further, nor do the king's writs under the great seal go any
further."3 3 Additionally, while Virginia's reception statute acknowledged
the authority of English statutes that had been enacted before 1607, it
rejected the authority of those enacted after that date.34

29. Richard L. Dale, 30 AM. L. REG. 9, 553-55 (1882) (citing Wilford v. Grant, 1
Kirby 114 (Conn. 1786)), availableat https://www.jstar.org/stable/3305039.
30. Id. at 553 (quoting U.S. v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 394 (1798)).
31. Id. at 555 (quoting Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 363 (1852)).
32. See Dale, supra note 29.
33. See HALL, supra note 8 (quoting John Winthrop, Winthrop's Journal:History of
New England 1630-1649, 2:352 (New York, 1908)).
34. See INST. FOR U.S. LAW, supra note 26.
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Even Blackstone questioned the authority of English law in the
colonies. 3 6 In his Commentaries, Blackstone distinguished two
situations.3 6 In the first, "an uninhabited country be discovered and
planted by English subjects."3 7 In such a situation, English laws "are
immediately there in force." 38 But, "this must be understood with very
many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only so
much of English law as is applicable to their own situation and the
condition of an infant colony." 39 More importantly, in "conquered or
ceded countries" the "ancient laws of the country remain" until altered
by the king.40
Our American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest or . .. by
treaties. And therefore the common law of England, as such, has
no allowance or authority there; they being no part of the mother
country, but distinct, though dependent, dominions.4
Blackstone's reflections produce, at a minimum, a more cautious
picture of the common law's reception.4 2 While the common law might
be revered by some as a birthright, it could also be regarded with
suspicion as an illegitimate transplant whose reception was neither
inevitable nor uncontroversial. Rather than a "birthright," it was a body
of law that could have been adopted by colonists, but only if they
concluded it would serve their needs. Rather than a "general system of
improved reason" it represented the answers of English law and custom
to the problems its people had faced.43 And rather than a comprehensive
system of doctrine, it might only be a set of starting points for further
judicial decision-making." At the least, its reception could well be
regarded as only a product of positive law, in which case Virginia's
reception of the common law would be limited to the terms and
conditions of its reception statute.

35. WILuAM BLACKSTONE,
(Oxford ed., 1st ed. 1765).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

42. See Dale, supra note 4, at 553.

43. Id. at 553-55.
44. Id. at 555.

106-08
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III. MICHIGAN'S TANGLED HISTORY

In one sense, Michigan had received the common law well before its
1850 Constitution. To see how, and to what extent, that reception had
already taken place requires some history about how Michigan was
created from a much larger territorial expanse.
The land that now comprises Michigan was originally part of the
Northwest Territory, created by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.45 That
Territory spanned across what would later become five states-Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin-and parts of a sixth,
Minnesota.4 Of these, Ohio was the first to become a state; to effectuate
that transition, the Northwest Territory was subdivided in 1800 into the
Indiana Territory, on the one hand, and Ohio and the eastern half of what
is now Michigan's Lower Peninsula, on the other.47 Then, Ohio was
admitted as a state; the eastern half of Michigan was at the same time
annexed to the Indiana Territory and the Northwest Territory ceased to
exist.48 Later, in 1805, Congress carved the Michigan Territory out from
the Indiana Territory.49 What are now the states of Indiana and Illinois
were later segregated from the bulk, with occasional readjustments to the
border defining Michigan, and leaving the Michigan territory to include
some of what is now Ohio, Iowa, and the eastern part of Minnesota.o In
1824, Michigan was elevated to the second grade of territorial status, and
in 1834 the Michigan territory was expanded to include all of Minnesota
and the eastern parts of North and South Dakota.51 In 1836, the
Wisconsin Territory was organized, to consist of the present states of
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, together with the eastern portion of the
Dakotas. Finally, in 1837, Michigan became a state; territorial
readjustments gave the state its current expanse.52
45. Historical Publications of Wayne County Michigan, documents Relating to the
Erection of Wayne County and Michigan Territory, 3 (1922-1923).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Id. at 9-11.
49. Id. at 37-38.
50. Id. at 38-39.
51. Id.
52. See Wise, supra note 23, at 1510. The astute reader will have noticed an oddity
about the dates. Michigan's first Constitution came in 1835, but it wasn't recognized as a
state until 1837. As Edward Wise observed:
The precise date on which Michigan achieved statehood is controversial. In
1833, the territorial council petitioned Congress for an enabling act
authorizing the election of a convention to draft a state constitution.
Congress delayed passing such an act because of the boundary dispute with
Ohio over the Toledo strip. Nonetheless, on January 26, 1835, without

2017]

MICHIGAN'S RECEPTIONOF THE COMMON LAW

403

Although the Northwest Territory encompassed several states, the
initial governmental organization did not depend on, or even recognize,
those divisions. 53 The whole of the Territory was subject to a governor, a
secretary and three judges, all appointed by Congress; 54 the governor and
the court shared legislative authority;55 and a true Legislature would be
elected later. The first territorial subdivisions to be recognized were
counties, with some local judicial and administrative functions. The first
instantiation of Wayne County was organized in 1796 to include most of
the land that would become the Michigan Territory along with parts of
what are now Ohio and Indiana.s? Wayne County was reorganized in
1803 when Ohio became a state and the eastern portion of Michigan was
reconnected to the Indiana Territory;5 at that point, the County
encompassed all of what is now Michigan's Lower Peninsula, much of
the Upper Peninsula, and parts of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin that
drained into Lake Michigan.
From the outset, a dispute arose about the legislative powers of the
Territory's governor and judges. Section 5 of the Ordinance provided
that:
The Governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and
publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal
and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the
circumstances of the district .

.

. but afterwards the Legislature

shall have authority to alter them as they shall think fit.5 9
The first Governor was Arthur St. Clair; the first judges, Parsons,
Symmes, and Varnum. On July 30, 1788, Governor St. Clair wrote to
congressional approval, the territorial council called for the election of
delegates to the convention that produced the Michigan Constitution of 1835.
The constitution was ratified in October 1835; a governor and legislature
were elected at the same time. The new state government began to function
on November 1, 1835, although Michigan was not formally recognized as a
state by the federal government until January 26, 1837.
Id.
53. Northwest Ordinance, An Ordinance for the government of the Territory of the
United States northwest of the River Ohio, § 1 (July 13, 1787), available at
avalon.law.yale.edu/1 8thcentury/nworder.asp.
54. Id. at §§ 3-4.
55. Id. at § 5.
56. Id. at § 11.
57. Burton Historical Collection, Proclamation by Winthrop Sargent, 1796, DET.
PuB. LIBR. (1992), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924028870546.
58. Burton Historical Collection, Proclamation by William Henry Harrison, 1803,
DET. PuB. LIBR. (1992), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924028870546.
59. See Historical Publications, supra note 45.
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Parsons and Varnum to object that they were overstepping their
boundsi 0 As St. Clair saw it, the grant of legislative authority only
empowered them to adopt laws that had already been adopted in the
original states: they had, in his view, no proper power to enact new laws,
nor even to combine parts of laws into a new whole.61 The judges, on the
other hand, perceived a larger need and justification. What, in their view,
was required, were laws that were "necessary and best suited to the
circumstances of the district;" any more literal or limited reading of the
Ordinance's grant of legislative authority would defeat the purposes of
the Ordinance, and would fail to produce laws suited to the needs of a
new territory. 62
The Ordinance also provided the foundations of a legal system, and
in that respect provided that legal disputes in the Northwest Territory
were tied in important ways to the common law. Section 4 of the
Northwest Ordinance, providing for three judges, established that they
"shall have a common law jurisdiction." 6 3 Section 14 of the Northwest
Ordinance further provided that certain following "articles shall be
considered as articles of compact between the original States and the
people and States in the said territory."6 Of those, Article II stated that
the inhabitants of the Territory should "always be entitled to the benefits
of' writs of habeas corpus, and trial by jury; a proportionate
representation of the people in the Legislature; and of judicial
proceedings "according to the course of the common law." 65
Michigan history is less clear, and perhaps less laudatory, about the
role of the common law. To be sure, the Schedule to the 1850
Constitution provided, "The common law and the statute laws now in
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force."6 6 But
reference to the common law was new. The antecedent in Michigan's
first Constitution reads differently: "All laws now in force in the territory
of Michigan, which are not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in
force until they expire by their own limitations, or be altered or repealed
by the legislature." What can be seen is a struggle from the founding of
the Northwest Territory to the 1850 Constitution about the virtues, and
the centrality, of the common law in creating laws for Michigan.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

MICH. CONST. of 1850, § 1.
67. MICH. CONST. of 1835, § 2.

66.
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The struggle can be seen, at the outset, in a sharp disagreement
between the Territory's Governor and its judges. 68 St. Clair advocated a
narrow construction of the Ordinance's grant of legislative power,
contending that the Territory's legislative power was limited to
"adopting" laws, and that required that those adopted already had been
enacted by one of the original states. 69 As it turns out, St. Clair rejected
an expansive legislative power in part because he hoped that common
law would play the dominant role instead. In his view, the common law
could provide an "unchanging framework of legal principles" that would
limit the scope of judicial legislation.7 0 Put differently, St. Clair believed
reliance on common law would limit the power of judges. In contrast,
Judges Parsons and Varnum argued for an expansive legislative power,
and decried the common law as undesirably tied to the circumstances of
its English origins, including the dominance of a monarchy over the
needs of the Territory's people.7 1 By most measures, St. Clair's vision
seems to have prevailed. In 1795, the judges adopted a reception statute
for the Northwest Territory, modeled on. Virginia's earlier 1776
legislation:
. . . The common law of England, all statutes or Acts of the
British Parliament in aid of the common law, prior to [1607] and
which are general in nature, not local to that kingdom, and also
the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be the rule of
decision, and shall be considered as of full force.72
Ohio's establishment as a state occasioned a new territorial
government.73 William Hull was appointed Governor of Michigan in
1805, and the three new judges were Augustus Woodward, Frederick
Bates and John Griffin.74 After Bates was replaced in 1808 by James
Witherell, he, Woodward, and Griffin were a stable panel of Michigan's
highest judges for sixteen years. Of these, Woodward's was the
dominant voice, and he sought to craft a law for Michigan that was
rooted in a sense of justice shared by the whole territorial community.
68. See supra text accompanying note 20.
69. See Historical Publications, supra note 45.
70. Richard P Cole, Law and Community in the New Nation: Three Visions for
Michigan, 1788-1831, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 161, 182 (1995).
71. See Historical Publications, supra note 45.
72. See INST. FOR U.S. LAW, supra note 26.
73. Cole, supra note 70, at 192.
74. Id. at 195-96.
75. Id. at 196.
76. Id. at 197.
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Among other things, this meant that the territory's law should reflect its
foundations in settlers from both French and English origins. 7 With that,
Woodward also argued against the wholesale "continuance . . . in the

United States of common law." What he wanted instead was a wide
range of discretion in making laws, with the expectation that the result
would be laws both appropriate to Michigan's particular circumstances,
and comprehensible to the populace.79
Woodward's tenure on the Michigan bench overlapped substantially
with the governorship of Lewis Cass, appointed in 1813 and serving until
183 1.80 Cass differed sharply from Woodward in his view of judicial
lawmaking. For Cass, "a central object of judicial lawmaking was the
development of central and stable principles of law, insulated from the
perturbations of momentary popular sentiment." 81 Cass's influence was
considerable, and towards the end of his tenure as Governor, he wrote:
But the great principles, which protect the rights of persons and
property in our country, are too firmly established and too well
understood to require or even to admit frequent or essential
alteration. Their application and observation has been settled for
ages, and it is the part of the true wisdom to leave them as we
have found them, with such changes only, as may be necessary,
to remedy existing evils, or to accommodate them to the
82
advancing opinions of the age.
To recall the observation of Professors Hall, Wiecek and
Finkelman,83 this brief summary of Michigan legal history shows, at the
least, that its reception was both labored and controversial.
IV. WHAT IS "THE COMMON LAW" THAT IS TO BE RECEIVED?

Surveying the attitudes of Michigan's territorial governors and
judges reveals a wide disparity of views about the common law. On the
one hand, it was praised as a fount of wisdom and a bulwark to protect
rights. On the other hand, it was derided as antiquated, monarchial, and a
limitation on judicial creativity. How can one and the same idea provoke
so many divergent and opposed reactions? This leads, in turn, to another
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 200, 213.
Id. at 201.
Cole, supra note 70.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 236.
See HALL, supra note 8.
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question. When a legal system "receives" the common law, what do we
mean by "the common law" such that we can investigate how it
(whatever it is) was received? The answer turns out to be much more
complex than one might antictiate.
In an earlier discussion, I observed that we can differentiate (at
least) three related but distinct ideas that fall under the heading "the
common law" as lawyers and judges tend to think of it.85 Recognizing
how these ideas are, in truth, distinct, can ground our understanding of
how the common law's reception might offer such divergent prospects to
different viewers.
A. The Common Law as an HistoricalFact
There is, to begin with, a specific historical dimension to the
common law that begins with England's conquest by William of
Normandy. Prior to 1066, England was a conglomeration of kingdomsSussex, Essex, Northumberland, and so on, and the legal systems of
those various kingdoms-such as we can recognize the idea of a legal
system-tended to be quite local.86 Even after England's conquest, much
of the legal system was still local.
But William conquered all of England and imposed a national
system of government, including "royal" or national courts. The most
famous of these was King's Bench, but that was only part of a system of
national courts with bewilderingly overlapping jurisdictions-Chancery,
Court of the Exchequer, and others.89 The differences among them can
baffle the observer; what is important, for my purposes, was that the
royal courts were distinct from local courts, and from their predecessors
in Sussex and Northumberland, precisely because they were national in
jurisdiction. Decisions by these courts were accordingly authoritative for
all of England. 90 As they began, through their decision-making, to
develop somethinq that could be called law, that law would be common
to all of England. 9 Hence, the "common" law.

84. Vincent A. Wellman, A Common Mistake About the Common Law, MICH. B.J.,
Jan. 2013, at 39.
85. Id.
86. See Dale supra note 4, at 554.
87. Id.
88. Wellman, supra note 84.
89. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 11-18 (2002).
90. Id.
91. Id.

408

WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:395

One part of Blackstone's argument underscores the idea that the
common law was fundamentally limited by its history.92 Recall that, for
Blackstone, the American plantations were dependent on the mother
country, but nonetheless legally distinct because they had been wrested
away from the dominion of some pre-existing government.93 In
consequence, the common law of England could have no authority in the
colonies. 94 For better or worse, the common law of England was
common only to England and would not necessarily apply to foreign
territory even after the foreign territory was subjected to British rule.95
The conclusion would have been different if English colonists had
created a new dominion out of nature: in that situation, the colonists
would have carried English common law with them, albeit with very
great, and very many, restrictions.
When conceived along these lines, America's early period lacked
anything that could be thought of as a common law. Each state's
reception of English common law would depend on the specifics of the
steps-statutory or constitutional-taken by that state to adopt the
common law.9 These would be taken at different times, and-depending
on the wording of each state's receiving provision-could well differ in
scope. (As we have seen, different states made different provisions for
which English enactments were adopted.) Since no state's court could
hold sway beyond that state's jurisdiction, there would be no law
common to Michigan, Massachusetts, and Virginia. 97 Law common to all
the states could arise only by virtue of some federal act or judicial fiat.98
The prospect of a federal common law was raised in 1842 by Justice
Story's holding in Swift v Tyson.99 Thereafter, in the eyes of Grant
Gilmore and many others, for "the next half century the Supreme Court
of the United States became a great commercial law court. As novel
issues generated controversy and conflict, the court's function was to
propose a generally acceptable synthesis." 00 If a common law of the
country could work for commercial law, then it might be thought to work

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Dale, supra note 4.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
See Dale, supra note 4, at 553-54.
See generally GILMORE, supra note 1, at 20-21.
Id. at 20.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 34.
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for law in general. 0' But, as Moore confirms, Swift did not deter state
courts from continuing to make their own law in various areas.102
There is one respect in which the opinion in Moore might be taken to
suggest a law common to the various states. Recall that Justice Martin
distinguished Michigan's geography from that of England, and on that
ground, opined that the English rule "can aid us very little . .. as we have
no navigable streams within the common law signification of that
term."1 0 3 Instead, he wrote, "we accordingly find that in all the States that
[common law] rule has been enlarged so as to meet the condition and
wants of the public and necessities of trade and commerce." 10 In
particular, Justice Martin relied heavily on the reasoning of an earlier
case in Maine, Brown v. Chadbourn,10 5 which had also concluded that a
stream's use for floating logs rendered it navigable.
Justice Martin relied, in other words, on a consensus that he found in
American cases discussing the same issues as those raised in Moore, and
felt justified in his conclusion because other courts, deciding analogous
cases, had reached the same conclusion. In that sense, Moore can be seen
to represent a kind of common law-namely, a tendency toward
commonality of reasoning.'1 But, however much Martin relied on the
decision of the Maine Supreme Court, there is no sense that he felt
obligated as a matter of law to decide Moore in the same way as Brown;
to the contrary, the opinion in Moore shows the highest court of one
jurisdiction making its own decision, for its own reasons. In that sense,
the early American states lacked a law common to all the country, and in
that sense the common law was not received.
B. The Common Law as a Body ofRules
This leads to the second idea that is encompassed by "the Common
Law." England's national courts exercised their power through decisions
in particular cases, but in the course of deciding those cases, what
emerged from the royal courts (especially King's Bench) was a
collection of doctrines to resolve disputes about accidents, broken
agreements, contested property and so forth. In our modem terminology,
the royal courts developed legal rules that could at least be distilled from
the centuries of judicial decision-making. Those rules could be captured,
101. Id.
102. Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519 (1853).
103. Id. at 522.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 524-25 (citing Brown v. Chadbourn, 31 Me. 9 (1849)).
106. I owe this point to Professor Stephen Calkins, Wayne State University Law
School.
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more or less, and written down, thereafter to be learned and used. In a
particularly salient manifestation of that process, Blackstone could
record, in his Commentaries, much of the then-current doctrines that
were recognized and employed in the courts of England. 107 In this second
sense of "the common law" we can understand how various states might
"receive" the common law: American jurisdictions could accept the set
of rules that had been dominant in English legal decisions at some
particular time and incorporate them into a body of law for their state's
courts.
Recall Virginia's ordinance of 1776:
. . . That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of

Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to [1607] and
which are of general nature, not local to that kingdom, together
with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now
in force, so far as the same may be consist with the several
ordinances, declarations and resolutions of the General
Convention, shall be the rule of decisions and shall be
considered in full force until the same shall be altered by the
legislative power of this colony.108
Focusing on this second conception of "the common law"-the "rules of
decisions"-renders straightforward the idea of 'reception': when
Virginia received the common law, it received all the rules of English
common law-"lock, stock, and barrel" as Gilmore phrased it-and used
them thereafter as part of the "rules of decision" for Virginia courtS.109
We can extend this idea in some predictable ways. Something similar
happened in 1787 for the Northwest Territory, when the Ordinance
vested the territorial judges with a common law jurisdiction, and
guaranteed the territory's inhabitants "judicial proceedings according to
the course of the common law." Then, again, Michigan's 1850
Constitution provided that "the common law . . . shall remain in force

until they expire by their own limitations or are altered or replaced by the
legislature." 10 So, by its Constitution, Michigan "received" the common
law, and in keeping with this second dimension of what might be meant
by "the common law," incorporated the then-existing rules of contracts,
property, agency and the like.

107.
108.
109.
110.

See Dale, supra note 4.
INST. FOR U.S. LAW, supra note 26, at Reception Statute of Virginia (1776).
See GILMORE, supra note 1.
See MICH. CONST. of 1850, § 1.

2017]

MICHIGAN'S RECEPTION OF THE COMMON LAW

411

No matter how dramatic the decision in Moore might seem to be, we
can observe numerous instances where early Michigan courts were
confident that the common law applied, and accordingly, used rules from
the common law of England to decide Michigan cases. Several of those
instances called on the court to justify its use of common law rules in the
face of challenges to their authority. For example, in Stout v Keyes,11' the
court was confronted with the argument that "if the action would lie at
the common law, that law is not in force in this state as a means of civil
remedy." 112 The court dismissed the argument:
This is a somewhat startling proposition to be seriously urged at
this time, when this court, as well as the circuit courts, have been
adjudicating common law actions upon common law rules and
principles, since their organization under the state government;
and also, the territorial courts had done so previously, from the
organization of the territorial government under the acts of
congress and the ordinance of 1787. It can require but a few
moments' consideration." 3
In another instance, the court took pains to affirm the validity of
English common law rules regarding mortgages, in the face of challenges
that those rules lacked authority in the Michigan context. In Abbott v.
Godfroy's Heirs,114 the fundamental issue was the validity of a mortgage
that was asserted to have been executed to secure payment of a debt."'
Defendants argued that the instrument in question was "not a mortgage at
common law" and moreover that the Northwest Territory Ordinance had
substituted new requirements for the validity of a mortgage, which new
requirements had not been met.116 The court rejected both arguments." 7
In the first place, the court concluded that the instrument in question,
whatever else was true, was an equitable mortgage and hence
enforceable as such under common law." 8 In the next breath, the court
rejected the applicability of the Ordinance's specific rules, because "the
territory comprising this state remained under the control and jurisdiction
of the British government until the year 1796, and that the ordinance,

111. Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845).

112. Id. at 188.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Abbott v. Godfroy's Heirs, 1 Mich. 178 (1849).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187.
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though made before, was not in full force until after that time." 119 Thus,
adhering to the common law's treatment of mortgages led the court to
evade the application of an inconsistent provision in the Ordinance.
C. The Common Law as a Body ofMethods and Values
The second conception of the common law-a set of rules used to
decide cases-can be a trap for the unwary. At any given moment, it is
true, the then-current state of the common law can be read as a set of
rules, but it would be a mistake to treat those rules as if they were fixed
and impervious to change. To the contrary, some knowledge of English
legal history shows that those rules were subject to dramatic change,
although often at a pace that would evade recognition. 120
Recognizing that the common "law" was more than just a fixed set
of rules leads to what I want to distinguish as the third dimension of "the
common law." As I have argued, the rules that we most often associate
with the common law were the result of changes over centuries of
judicial decision-making; we can therefore understand that part of the
"common law" was a process by which English judges came to
reformulate and refine those rules together with a set of assumptions that
would shape their use of that process. That process, with an emphasis on
the ideas of stare decisis and precedent, distinguished English common
law from code law, its Continental counterpart. 12 1 If we focus on this
dimension of the "common law," then "receiving" the common law
would mean receiving the assumptions and methods that English judges
employed as they produced the rules that Blackstone reported. Put
differently, if Michigan judges employed methods and assumptions that
emerged from their English antecedents and developments, then in that
sense, Michigan received the common law.
1. Law as Rules and Methods for Using Them
Some investigation shows that the common law was indeed more
than a body of rules to be applied; that characterization would neglect
important facets of how English and American authorities used the
common law's rules. Recall Blackstone's theory about the force of the
119. Id. at 181.
120. As I discuss later, infra n.150, what is described as the law of contracts was the
product of several centuries of growth in the English law relating to the writ of assumpsit.
Since assumpsit was part of what we would today call the law of torts, the development
of contracts was a significant growth of that area of law.
121. Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World,
25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 474 (2000).
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common law when an uninhabited land was "discovered and planted by
English subjects." 122 In that situation, he wrote, English laws were in
force, but "only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own
situation and the condition of an infant colony."l2 3 On this vision, it
could be presumed that the rules of English common law would apply,
but that presumption could be rebutted by facts that were true of the new
situation and different from those of England. In terms more familiar to
practicing lawyers, to understand a rule fully requires that one
understand the grounds for its applicability, and have the capacity to
distinguish situations where it does not apply.
Much of the court's reasoning in Moore exhibits this pattern. As the
parties and the court-well knew, the English common law rule defined
navigability by commercial transportation by boat.1 24 The court had little
patience for the rule, or its antecedents:
The doctrine of the English Common Law in relation to
navigable rivers, can aid us very little . . . as we have no

navigable streams within the common law signification of that
term. Nor can its doctrine as to rivers not navigable, yet public
highways from their adaptation to public use, be fully and
literally adopted by us. The length and magnitude of many of our
rivers, the occasions and necessities for their use, and the nature
and character of our internal commerce, all require a liberal
adaptation of those doctrines to our circumstances and wants,
and to a condition of things, both as to capability of our streams
for public use, and the occasion for such use, entirely different
from, and in many respects altogether new to, those which
concurred to establish the common law rule.... 2 5
The same pattern is displayed in other early cases. In Lorman v.
Benson,126 for example, the court considered a challenge by the operator
of an ice house on the Detroit River.127 He complained of the defendant's
boom on the same waters, creating a space for defendant's purpose of
keeping and securing saw logs therein.1 2 8 In sum, operating the boom

122. WLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs
M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1899).
123. Id.
124. Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519 (1853).
125. Id. at 522.
126. Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860).
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id. at 32-34.

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
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interfered with the plaintiff s ice house business.12 9 Writing for the court,
Justice Campbell observed:
Practically the common law has prevailed here, in ordinary
matters, since our government took possession; and the country
has grown up under it. How, or by what particular means, it
originated, would open an inquiry more curious than useful. A
custom which is as old as the American settlements, and has
been universally recognized by every department of government
has made it the law of the land, if not made so otherwise . . . We
are of the opinion that questions of property, not clearly excepted
from it, must be determined by the common law, modified only
by such circumstances as render it inapplicable to our local
affairs.130
Upon reviewing English common law, the court acknowledged that
English rules that were tied to the ebbing and flowing of the tides would,
of course, not apply to the Detroit River. 13 1 But the court reasoned that
the tidal flow was only a way of marking riparian rights; there were other
ways to establish those rights and, once they were established, to extract
the plaintiffs legal basis. 132 On that basis, the court affirmed the
plaintiffs suit. 133
And, in Perrinv. Lepper,1 34 the court rejected the applicability of the
common law doctrine of attornment.135 There, the owners of property in
Marshall had leased the property for a term of five years, in exchange for
an annual sum, payable quarterly.136 One of the owners then sold his
interest in the property to another, and gave the lessees notice that one
half of the rents should be paid to the purchasers.1 3 7 Upon non-payment,
the new owners sued specifically on the lease, and the lessees defended
on the grounds that they had not consented to the lessor's sale and
38
transfer of his interest in the lessee's payments.1

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27, 30, 32.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
Perrin v. Lepper, 34 Mich. 292, 294 (1876).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 293-94.
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This consent was called an attornment. It was founded upon a
state of society which certainly never had any existence in
Michigan. The peculiar reasons and relations out of which this
doctrine sprung never having had any existence here, why should
the rule itself? Where the reasons from whence a rule arose cease
to exist, the rule should cease also. In a country where they never
existed, the rule should not be adopted. Of course there may be
exceptions to this. Other reasons for continuing a rule may arise
while those from whence the rule grew have passed away, but
we discover none such in this instance. The doctrine of
attornment is inconsistent with our laws, customs and
institutions.139

2. Law as Rules and Principles
Finally, it can be seen that, in other cases, the common law was
treated not as a set of rules to be applied, but also as a source of
"principles" which could help generate new rules for application to
Michigan's circumstances. So, for example, in Stout v. Keyes,140 an issue
of title to real estate arose, and a challenge was made to the plaintiffs
proceeding by an action on the case. 14 1 The court rejected the challenge,
reasoning:
It is a general principle of the common law, that whenever the
law gives a right, or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by
action; and where no specific remedy is give[n] for an injury
complained of, a remedy may be had by special action on the
case.

142

Similarly, in Perrin, after rejecting the doctrine of attornment, the court
wrote, "The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to
be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general
principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them
and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation." 14 3
We should note an important complexity that haunts any discussion
of "law" and, in consequence, discussions of the "common law."
Lawyers and judges are prone to think of 'rules' when they think of law,
139. Id. at 295.
140. Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845).
141. Id. at 185-86.

142. Id. at 187.
143. Perrin, 34 Mich. at 295 (quoting Story, J. in Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137,
144 (1829)).
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and, on this understanding, the rules of agency, property, and the like
will be a central part of the common law that was received. But, we can
thank Ronald Dworkin for observing that there can be more to "law"
than just rules. As Dworkin observed, the kind of decisional law that we
think so central to the common law includes not only rules, but also
"principles, policies, and other sorts of standards." 144
Some of the standards other than rules are to be found in the maxims
of the common law that are relied on by judges when deciding hard
cases-"no one should profit from his own wrongdoing"1 45 is a salient
example. So, too, are the various maxims of interpretation and
construction like "expressio unis" or "contra proferentum" that figures
significantly in the efforts to interpret and apply texts like wills,
contracts, statutes and even constitutions. In Dworkin's most famous
example, the New York Court of Appeals relied on the "no profit"
maxim to deny an inheritance to a grandson who had murdered his
grandfather to collect on the will that named the murdered as principal
beneficiary.'4 To apply the will's provisions in the usual way would
conflict so powerfully with the no-profit maxim that the court denied the
grandson's inheritance, and left the bulk of the estate to two distant
relatives instead. 147
Acknowledging Dworkin's point can be significant when examining
the common law's reception, because his understanding of "law" can
reshape our appreciation of what was received. In particular, Dworkin's
argument about the nature of "law" can undermine a frequent
misconception of the common law as essentially static in nature. If the
common law consists only of rules when it is received, then there is a
natural drift to expect that those same rules should remain in place until
"altered" by subsequent developments. And, from there, it can be an easy
slide to regard as ultra vires any judicial change, in the form of additions
or alterations to the set of rules. However, Dworkin's understanding of
the "law" would undermine any such static conception of the common
law and would lead us instead to expect that the set of rules would
change over time. As Dworkin observes, principles and policies have

144. RONALD DwoluaN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). I have argued
elsewhere that the conception of law articulated by Dworkin in his early works is best
understood as an extension of the ideas expressed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in
their wide-ranging but unruly manuscript, The Legal Process. See Vincent A. Wellman,
Dworkin and the Legal Process: the Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 Aluz. L. REv. 413
(1987).
145. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
146. Id. at 190.
147. Id. at 191.
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"weight" that can depend on the situation to which they are applied. 148
So, as social and economic conditions change, the relevant principles and
policies of law will wax and wane in importance, and, as a result, prompt
judges and lawyers to rethink how well the set of rules fit with the
underlying principles and policies. 14 9
For example, no picture of twentieth-century American contract law
could be complete without acknowledging the kind of case law
developments prompted by the force of the reliance principle in contract
law.so Put differently, no static picture of American contract law would
be adequate; it would miss how, and why, that law has changed. Unless
we supposed that "principles, policies, and other sorts of standards" were
only a twentieth-century innovation, no picture of the common law
would be adequate without recognizing those non-rule components of the
common law.151 And, unless we suppose that those non-rule components
of the law were an American mutation, no picture of the common law as
it came to us from England would be complete without them. Put
differently, since "the common law" incorporated all of its elements and,
148. DWORKIN, supra note 144, at 26.
149. Id. at 22.
150. In England and America before the 1880s, the dominant conception of the
"consideration" needed to make a promise enforceable was expressed in terms of a
benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. But, that idea of consideration was
supplanted by another: the idea of "reciprocal conventional inducement" that was
propounded by Oliver Wendell Holmes in THE COMMON LAW and was thereafter
enshrined by the Restatement of Contracts as the "bargained for" test for consideration.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
Just how Holmes could succeed in completely reshaping, on nothing but his own
say-so, the law of contracts is a mystery well worth pondering, but reshape it he did, and
as a result, the pattern of judicial decisions shifted as well. What is most important, for
my purposes, is the changed results in cases where a promise had relied to his detriment.
Under the earlier, benefit-detriment theory of consideration, promises could be enforced
on the strength of the promisee's reliance. But, under the later, Holmesian test, reliance
would be important only if it was 'bargained for'-that is, if the relialice was sought by
the promisor in exchange for her promise, and was, moreover, given by the promisee in
exchange for the promisor's commitment. Promises that had been enforceable under the
older test would now be unenforceable under Holmes' more stringent criterion. Soon
thereafter, however, what emerged was a series of decisions that held the promise
enforceable because it had engendered reliance. Sometimes those cases justified their
conclusions under a heading of "estoppel" and the idea came to be called promissory
estoppel. Ultimately, it too came to be enshrined in the Restatement, taking root in
section 90 and thereafter growing like topsy. Further, once unleashed, the reliance idea
came to figure prominently in a wide range of contexts-reliance on offers before they
were accepted, reliance on promises that would otherwise have been unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds, and reliance on promises in letters of intent that
explicitly contemplate a further, definitive agreement are some, but not all, of the new
contexts in which the reliance principle figures in twentieth-century contract law.
151. DWORKIN, supra note 144.
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with those, the dynamic that they engendered, receiving the common law
would necessarily receive those non-rule elements and the accompanying
dynamic engendered by them. 152
Dworkin's conception of law has further implications.
Understanding the law as a body that includes rules and other norms also
changes our grasp of the duty of a court. A court is obligated to apply the
law, and in simple cases, the duty can be fulfilled by identifying the
appropriate rule and applying it in a straightforward way. But, in more
complex cases, the court's duty to apply the law goes beyond identifying
and applying a particular rule. Instead, the court is obligated to
understand the whole body of law that might bear on the dispute-the
rules (both written and decisional) as well as the principles and policies.
In its fullest expression, Dworkin's conception of the law requires a court
to integrate all the law-constitutional, statutory, and decisional rules, as
well as the underlying principles and policies.1 5 3 The right answer is what
follows from that fully integrated theory of the jurisdiction's law.
On this more complex conception of law, the common law of
England cannot sensibly be separated from the rest of English law, and
the role of a court to accept and apply the common law will depend in
part on how the relevant aspect of the common law fits with the rest of
English law. Thus, while English decisions recognized the distinction
between law and equity, understanding English common law would also
require an understanding of the function of equity in the English legal
system and of the boundary, as English courts understood it, between law
and equity.154

152. Rejecting a static conception of English common law makes sense, even without
the benefit of Dworkin's framework. The more we understand the history of the law
relating to torts, property, and the rest, the more we understand that the set of operative
rules changed over the centuries and that the rules as Blackstone set them down were
only the rules that were in place at the time he was writing. Since those changes took
place over centuries, and since they were worked out in decisions that involved the
pleading intricacies of the English writs, the changes were easy to miss. Here is one
example: we can see that contract law, as we now recognize it, emerged slowly from the
writ of assumpsit, which itself arose from the law of trespass. That is, contract law arose
from what we would now recognize as tort law. True, there had been antecedent writs of
debt and covenant, which recognized agreements and enforced them when appropriate.
But, those writs had important limitations that kept them from generalizing into a larger
category of contracts, and the larger idea-with its components of consideration,
formation, performance and remedies-emerged over centuries of English lawyers trying
to win cases for their clients by using whatever materials they could find.
153. See generally RONALD DwoRiN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 144 (discussing the challenge faced by Hercules, a judge of superhuman
intellect).
154. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 62.
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Among the artifacts of English legal history is the distinction
between courts of law and courts of equity, and with that distinction, a
distinction between those matters properly of "law," as opposed to those
properly of "equity.""' As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in
Romatz v. Romatz: 156

The powers and jurisdiction of the circuit courts and circuit
judges in chancery, in and for their respective counties, shall be
coextensive with the powers and jurisdiction of the courts and
judges in chancery in England as existing on March first, 1847,
with the exceptions, additions and limitations created and
imposed by the Constitution and laws of this State. 157
In 1849, in Norris v. Hill,1s8 the Michigan Supreme Court needed to
interpret and apply its equitable jurisdiction to decide the rights of mill
owners on opposite sides of the Huron River.1 5 9 A series of land sales
had been followed by years of use, resulting in a complaint that one mill
owner was infringing the rights of another by using too much water. 160 It
was asserted that a court of chancery had "power to ascertain and
determine, by decree, the rights of the respective parties[.]" 16 1 But the
court declined to do so, reasoning that the statute creating equitable
jurisdiction "was not intended to enlarge or extend the jurisdiction" of
courts of equity. 62
What could ground the court's reasoning on this point? Receiving
the common law would mean only that the court inherited common law's
rules and doctrines; being given equitable jurisdiction would mean only
that the court was empowered to decide cases that would traditionally
have been heard in chancery. But, as the court observed in Romatz:
The jurisdiction of this court is that of the English chancery, with
the various additions which have been made to it by our own
laws. This court has jurisdiction in case of fraud, and especially
in all cases of contracts procured by fraud. In such cases this
court effectually annuls the fraudulent contract, adjudges it void,
causes it to be delivered up or canceled, or prohibits the parties
155. Id.
156. Romatz v. Romatz, 355 Mich. 81, 88, 94 N.W.2d 432, 436 (1959).
157. Id. (quoting MICH. ColP. LAWS § 606.4 (1948)).
158. Norris v. Hill, 1 Mich. 202, 203 (1849).

159. Id. at 203-04.
160. Id. at 210.

161. Id.
162. Id.
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from claiming any right under it. Such is the undoubted
jurisdiction of this court in other cases of contracts; and if this
court has not the same jurisdiction where the contract of
marriage has been procured by fraud, it is the only case of a
fraudulent contract to which its jurisdiction does not extend. The
jurisdiction of equity in cases of fraudulent contracts seems
sufficiently comprehensive to include the contract of marriage,
and though this may be a new application of the power of this
court, I do not perceive that it is an extension of its
jurisdiction.1 63
What remains in question is the boundary between the two
jurisdictions. What is the source, and the authority, of the rules that
define and regulate the boundaries between law and equity? The answer
could not come from either law or equity, but must emerge from court's
reasoning about their proper role in a system that involves both kinds of
powers.
Finally, we can observe an underlying pragmatism at work in Moore,
and elsewhere. In rejecting the common law test of navigability, Justice
Martin reasoned at length about the importance of water transport for
Michigan's emerging industries:
The servitude of the public interest depends rather upon the
purpose for which the public requires the use of its streams, than
upon any particular mode of use-and hence, in a region where
the principal business is lumbering, or the pursuit of any
particular branch of manufacturing or trade, the public claim to a
right of passage along its streams must depend upon their
capacity for the use to which they can be made subservient. In
one instance, perhaps, boats can only be used profitably, from
the nature of the product to be transported-whilst, in another
they would be utterly useless. Upon many of our streams,
although of sufficient capacity for navigation by boats, they are
never seen-whilst rafts of lumber of immense value, and mill
logs which are counted by thousands, are annually floated along
them to market. Accordingly, we find that a capacity to float
rafts and logs in those States where the manufacture of lumber is
prosecuted as a branch of trade, is recognized as a criterion of
the public right of passage and of use, upon the principle already

163. Romatz v. Romatz, 355 Mich. 81, 89, 94 N.W.2d 432, 436 (1959).
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adverted to, that such right is to be ascertained from the public
necessity and occasion for such use.
It can be seen that his reasoning depends heavily on an understanding of
what, at the time, made Michigan's geographic and economic situation
different from the situation in England and, perhaps, other states:
We have a large territory yet undeveloped, rich in forest and in
mineral wealth-washed by vast bodies of water upon three
sides, and threaded by innumerable streams which are capable of
navigation .. . and with a commerce already established, rivaling
in extent, that of some of the Atlantic States, and rapidly
growing under the influence of increasing population,
settlements, and wealth, it is of the first importance that the
rights of the public be recognized, to the free use of all streams
susceptible of any valuable flotage .

.

. Although in some of the

States usage and custom has been regarded as the foundation of
this public right in fresh rivers, yet, in others the application of
this doctrine has been denied. In the new States, from necessity,
and of the very nature of things, such cannot be the foundation of
the public right. 165
Such a test would, of course, promote the use of Michigan's waters by
the timber industry which was, at the time, the State's largest.1 6 6
There is an even more important commitment to be discerned behind
the court's pragmatism. The court also embraced a view of its own
responsibilities which goes considerably beyond any simple
understanding of the common law's "reception." That is, the court not
only thought itself free to reconsider the traditional common law rule, it
felt obligated to do so. 167 In this, the Michigan Supreme Court seems to
have embraced a view of the judicial role that has come to be described
as instrumentalist. Instrumentalism can have a variety of understandings.
As one commentator observed, the word is defined in Webster's
Dictionary to mean "the pragmatic doctrine that ideas are plans for action
which serve as instruments for adjusting the organism to its
environment." 1 6 8 Another describes instrumentalism in the context of

164. Moore v. Sanbom, 2 Mich. 519, 525-26 (1853).
165. Id. at 524.
166. Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist
Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1381, 1397 (1989).
167. Moore, 2 Mich. at 525-26.
168. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1983).
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legal theory to mean the "legal rules and other forms of law [that] are
most essentially tools devised to serve practical ends, rather than general
norms laid down by officials in power, secular embodiments of natural
law, or social phenomena with a distinctive kind of past." 6 9
Discussions of American legal history have been particularly
influenced by Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law,
1780-1860, which argued at length that American legal developments
before the Civil War were strikingly instrumentalist, and that this
represented an important break from earlier approaches to judging: 7 0
What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century law from its
eighteenth century counterpart was the extent to which common
law judges came to play a central role in directing the course of
social change. Especially during the period before the Civil War,
the common law performed at least as great a role as legislation
in underwriting and channeling economic development. In fact,
common law judges regularly brought about the sort of farreaching changes that would have been regarded earlier as
entirely within the powers of the legislature . . As judges began
to conceive of common law adjudication as a process of making
and not merely discovering legal rules, they were led to frame
general doctrine based on a self-conscious consideration of
social and economic policies.171
Horwitz's description seems amply fulfilled by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Moore, as exemplified by this portion of the court's opinion:
The length and magnitude of many of our rivers, the occasions
and necessities for their use, and the nature and character of our
internal commerce, all require a liberal adaptation of those
doctrines to our circumstances and wants, and to a condition of
things, both as to capability of our streams for public use, and the
occasions for such use, entirely different from, and in many
respects altogether new to, those which concurred to establish
the common law rule, and we accordingly find that in all the
States that rule has been enlarged so as to meet the conditions

169. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 20

(1982).
170. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977).
171. Id. at 2-3.
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and wants of the public and the necessities of trade and
commerce.172
But the evidence of Moore should be put in proper perspective. As
we have seen, many Michigan decisions from the same era reveal a
Supreme Court that regularly followed English common law, unless
there was persuasive reason to do something different." 3 If pre-Civil
War decision-making is supposed to exemplify instrumentalist judging,
then instrumentalist courts must have recognized a considerable social
value in continuing many of the well-established rules. 174
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS

I began this exploration with the observation by Professors Hall,
Wiecek, and Finkleman, that the received wisdom about reception was
grounded in a series of mistaken assumptions. My brief survey of
Michigan's reception of the common law adds a few more erroneous
conclusions to this list.
First and foremost, there is the assumption that the common law that
was received was a body of rules, to be taken and applied to the States.
On some occasions, Michigan courts were prepared to accept common
law doctrines without reconsideration or revision. So far as I can tell, this
holds true for the basic rules of law that relate to accidents-personal
torts as we would now tend to describe them. But, in other controversies,
English common law served more as a starting point for rule-making by
courts, where it was accepted that the rules appropriate for Michigan's
economy would diverge as need be from their English antecedents. This
seems especially true for rules of property law. And, in still other
controversies, English common law would provide only broad principles
to guide Michigan's courts.
This implies a second unfounded assumption, namely that what it
meant for the rules of the common law to be "in force" would be the
same across the board. When the common law is understood not as a set
of rules but as a mixture of rules and broader principles, Michigan's
early judges seemed ready to derogate the force of the specific rules
whenever those seemed inapt, but more willing to respect the broad
principles that could be perceived to underlie the more specific rules.
172. Moore, 2 Mich. at 522.
173. See infra pp. 411-12 (discussing Stout v. Keys and Abbott v. Godfry's Heirs).
174. See Wise, supra note 23, at 1557-61 (observing that the abilities for which the
post-Civil War Michigan Supreme Court was praised had much more to do with the
technical competence of its opinions that its willingness to craft new doctrines).
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Finally, it must also be true that the idea of "the common law" must
be larger, and richer, than any set of authoritative rules. As that phrase
was understood at the time of the common law's reception, what was
fused with the common law was also the traditions, norms, and
assumptions that had shaped how English courts wielded their full range
of powers. When Michigan received "the common law" it received those
traditions and standards about how to wield the judicial power, so that
Michigan's courts could operate within that tradition.

